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Abstract
Radicalisation has become a highly influential idea in British policy
making. It underpins and justifies Prevent, a core part of the UK’s counter-
terrorism strategy. Experts have theorised the radicalisation process,
often beset by a weak evidence base and mired in fundamental contest-
ation on definitions and explanatory factors. Experiential experts have
been active contributors to these debates, presenting a challenge to
the low-ranking role often given to experiential knowledge in evidence
hierarchies and a contrast to policy areas in which it remains poorly
valued. This paper draws on interviews with radicalisation experts to
examine the dynamics of this pluralisation in practice. With a focus on
credibility contests, it explains how experiential experts can claim
authoritative knowledge and the challenges they face from those who
prioritise theory-driven empirical data as the basis for contributions to
knowledge. The paper draws out the implications for understandings of
expertise of this newly conceptualised, evidence poor and highly applied
topic area.
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Introduction
Prevent has been in place for nearly twenty years and remains a key pillar
of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy (HM Government, 2018). It seeks
to stop people ‘from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’ (HM
Government, 2018, 31). More specifically, it aims to prevent ‘radicalisation’
by countering and reducing support for extremist ideologies and intervening
with individuals who are ‘vulnerable’ to supporting or committing terrorist
acts. In this sense, Prevent is a risk management strategy that seeks to antici-
pate and pre-empt danger, part of a wider precautionary turn in countering
terrorism (Martin, 2014). The wide net cast by this early intervention
approach, and its impacts on individuals and communities, have been the
subject of extensive debate and heavy criticism particularly since the introduc-
tion of the Prevent Duty in 2015 and its responsibilisation of public services in
counter-radicalisation practice (e.g. Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2019; Sabir,
2017).
The focus here is on radicalisation, the theory on which this policy arc
stands. The UK government’s understanding of radicalisation has been set
out in successive Prevent policy documents. Concomitant to this policy devel-
opment has been the emergence of a radicalisation expert community that has
been active in researching and theorising the idea. A key segment of the expert
community is experiential experts. Practitioners, ex-extremists and commu-
nity activists have been visible from the start of the Prevent agenda, prominent
in policy debates and active contributors to the development of radicalisation
theory. This is in contrast to some areas of UK social policy in which relevant
knowledge from experts by experience, for example drug users (Monaghan
et al., 2018) and benefit claimants (Patrick, 2020), remains undervalued.
Even in areas of policy making that have more recently sought participation,
challenges remain in practice to the acceptance of non-established forms of
expertise and the meaningfulness of their inclusion has been questioned
(e.g. Smith-Merry, 2020; Tisdall, 2017).
Building on the debates over terrorism and expertise that have taken place
in this journal (e.g. Glasby and Beresford, 2006; Ragazzi, 2017), the paper
considers conceptualisations of radicalisation expertise with a particular
focus on the role of experiential knowledge. It examines how the credibility
of experiential experts is demonstrated as well as how it is challenged.
These challenges have precedence within terrorism studies; terrorism experts
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have previously articulated concerns that unqualified or inexperienced indivi-
duals are able to claim seemingly authoritative insights on terrorism (e.g.
Stampnitzky, 2011). Such debates raise questions about who is authorised
to speak on radicalisation and the limitations on diversity in the expert com-
munity. A focus on contested expertise enables an analysis of how the bound-
aries of expertise are constructed on this topic to include or exclude different
forms of knowledge.
The paper begins by providing background on evidence and expertise
on radicalisation, as well the nature and role of experiential knowledge in
conceptualisations of expertise. This is followed by an outline of the
methods used in the research. Data is then presented on the ways by which
the credibility of experiential experts is constructed and challenged on this
topic.
Knowledge on radicalisation and the boundaries
of expertise
Knowledge on radicalisation is embedded in the wider history of terrorism
studies. Stampnitzky (2013, 49–82) traces a shift since the 1970s from
policy and expert narratives of insurgency that acknowledged the relational
dynamics of conflict situations to those of terrorism that depoliticised acts of
political violence, instead characterising them as irrational and immoral.
Since the early 2000s, the causes of terrorism in turn have been understood
in terms of radicalisation and the focus of expert theory, policy and practice
in this area has largely been on individual risk indicators and pathways
(Silva, 2018; Younis, 2021). Research has shown that media reportage on ter-
rorism tends to reflect dominant perspectives (Miller and Mills, 2009; Silva,
2018, 45–6), which constrains expert narratives and the sources that are
able to speak on the topic (Ahmad, 2020). More generally, terrorism research
has tended to work largely within the interests of the policy community (Mills
et al., 2020). The boundaries of debate as well as the worthiness of different
types of knowledge are actively constrained by such features of this policy-led
and politicised topic area.
Underpinning policy narratives on radicalisation however are continuing
weaknesses in the evidence base. The issues detailed by terrorism studies scho-
lars, including a lack of empirical evidence, theoretical development and
workable policy and practice recommendations (e.g. Sageman, 2014) have
also been identified in radicalisation research (e.g. Bouhana and Wikstrom,
2011, 13–14; Feddes and Gallucci, 2015). While empirical evidence has
cumulated on particular factors, there is a remaining lack of evidence
around causality (Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018). The conclusion of a parliamentary
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inquiry into radicalisation published shortly after the release of the current
Prevent strategy was bleak: ‘The weakness of the evidence base came across
strongly during our inquiry’ (Home Affairs Committee, 2012, 10). A particu-
lar issue is the exclusion of data on or from those processed by state interven-
tions (Qureshi, 2020), with access blocked to researchers from the early days of
Prevent (e.g. King and Taylor, 2011, 615–8). Although a recent review of ter-
rorism studies finds an increase in methodological diversity and the use of
primary data, it shows no sign of a rise in the use of direct accounts from
such voices (Schuurman, 2020). The limited evidence base of Prevent has
been a central refrain of the research and policy community from the start
and undermines its central concept of radicalisation. Despite this, the
concept has reshaped dominant understandings of the causes of terrorism,
with implications seen in Prevent’s broad application of risk parameters
and continually disproportionate direction towards Muslim communities
(Pettinger, 2020). The reach and impact of the concept despite its difficult evi-
dence base raises questions as to the basis on which radicalisation expertise is
claimed, attributed and assessed.
This then is a topic area led by a dominant policy narrative that lacks a
strong evidence base. While these conditions have shaped the inclusivity
and terms of expert debate, there remains diversity among the actors that con-
tribute to knowledge generation and public debate on radicalisation. Research
on the topic is multidisciplinary, and think tanks and official agencies are
active sites of knowledge production alongside academia (Neumann and
Kleinmann, 2013, 369–70). Mythen et al. (2017) argue that Prevent’s
narrow conceptualisation of radicalisation fails to reflect the diverse and
often diverging research-based accounts coming from the expert community.
While dominant understandings of radicalisation focus on individual risk,
there are calls for more attention to political and social context (e.g.
Schmid, 2013, 2–5). There is no clearly agreed-upon definition of ‘radicalisa-
tion’ (Bailey and Edwards, 2017), and the literature suggests that it is a
complex, multifactorial process with a range of potential explanatory factors
(e.g. McGilloway et al., 2015). Prevent itself is characterised by distributed
governance and negotiated practice, with a myriad of activities and actors
involved (Home Office, 2011, 95–106), subject to contestation over policy
theory in the policy process and interpreted and implemented differently
across local areas (O’Toole et al., 2016). This means that as national strategy
filters through implementation structures, the meaning of radicalisation and
the assessment of its associated risks is constructed in practice (Pettinger,
2020). Although UK counter-radicalisation policy and the dominant narrative
that it promotes are myopic in their focus on the individual and the ideo-
logical, the expert community has produced conceptually and theoretically
plural accounts and a range of specialist knowledge underpins the topic
area. The paper analyses the construction of hierarchies of knowledge in this
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context, discussing the nature and implications of this broad and diverse dis-
tribution of knowledge in terms of expertise on radicalisation.
Radicalisation expertise is set in a context of broader changes in
conceptualisations of the nature of expertise. Nowotny (2003) talks of the
‘pluralisation of expertise’ as the rise of experience as a source of authorita-
tive knowledge alongside scientific knowledge and credentialed experts.
There are ongoing efforts to recognise and utilise the potential contributions
of experiential expertise in research, policy and practice (e.g. Stewart et al.,
2020), and research has demonstrated cases where expert credibility has
been extended to a wide range of actors (e.g. Epstein, 1995). As originally
conceptualised, experiential knowledge is ‘truth learned from personal
experience with a phenomenon’ (Borkman, 1976, 446), becoming expertise
when paired with an ability to use that knowledge to address a problem
(Borkman, 1976, 447). The significance of these discussions is that
those who are attributed expertise have the power to make authoritative
statements on the social world: they have a recognised ability to
conceptualise and explain a particular issue, as in Gieryn’s (1999) idea of
epistemic authority. Any attribution of expertise is of course subject to
the competition inherent to expert status (Evans, 2015, 21–3). Gieryn
(1999, 1) says that ‘“Credibility contests” are a chronic feature of the
social scene: bearers of discrepant truths push their wares wrapped in
assertions of objectivity, efficacy, precision, reliability, authenticity,
predictability, sincerity, desirability, tradition’. The stakes are the
believability of the knowledge claims and conceptual arguments that an
expert is promoting, and the outcomes shape who can claim an authoritative
voice on a topic.
Such contests are particularly apparent at the faultline between
research and experience-based knowledge. Despite movements towards
inclusive notions of expertise, the dominant discourse of evidence-based
policy making remains focused on the primacy of knowledge from
research and validity based on methodological rigour (Smith-
Merry, 2020). In terrorism studies, Jackson (2012) conceptualised
‘unknown knowns’ as knowledge that is ignored or downplayed, and
may include that which is judged to be inferior or ‘unscientific’ by other
analysts. Some have argued for more understanding of how counter-
terrorism strategies are experienced by those processed by counter-
terrorist systems and by Muslim communities more broadly (Jarvis, 2019;
Qureshi, 2020). A different perspective comes from a terrorism
scholar who states that many of those claiming expertise on terrorism
post-9/11 ‘are not truly scholars, are not versed in the scientific
method, and often pursue a political agenda’ (Sageman, 2014, 566). Such
comments signal attempts to reify the boundaries of expertise on the
topic, and these debates on voice and representation indicate that the
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political and competitive nature of expertise is brought to the fore in this
topic area.
Methodology
This paper draws on data from a pluralist analysis of radicalisation expertise
that examined the diversity of the expert community’s ideas, actors and
knowledge types. From this pluralist framework came an inclusive conceptu-
alisation of ‘radicalisation expert’ as those who claimed or were attributed
expert knowledge, or whose research or experience was suggestive of a specia-
lisation on the topic. The topic was defined as the nature and causes of radica-
lisation. This approach enabled a focus on where the boundaries of expertise are
drawn by the wide set of actors who contribute to knowledge generation in
practice. It complements other studies on core sets of terrorism researchers
(e.g. Miller and Mills, 2009). The study focused on peer judgements, examin-
ing the competing claims to credible knowledge within the expert
community.
The paper draws on data from interviews conducted with UK-based
experts between October 2012 and October 2014. The research used techni-
ques from the elite interviewing literature (Dexter, 2006; Wicker and
Connelly, 2014). A semi-structured approach was taken, with the topic
guide adapted as the research progressed and questioning responsive to inter-
viewees’ specialised knowledge. Thirty-two interviews were conducted, plus
two pilot interviews. On the basis of a documentary analysis carried out as
part of the wider project, a list of experts was created and purposively
sampled. The sample included individuals with a range of substantive perspec-
tives on radicalisation. It was comprised of fourteen academics, eleven think
tank researchers, and seven working in policy, practice and communities.
Many interviewees had diverse professional backgrounds across these sectors.
Interviews were recorded, with transcription carried out by the author soon
afterwards to enable ongoing reflection on the findings. Thematic accounts
of initial interviews were produced to explore emergent themes and further
refine interview schedules. Data was entered into NVivo and coded using
both concepts from the research questions as well as ideas from the data
itself (Mason, 1994, 91–95).
Ethical approval was gained from the University of Leeds. Privacy was a
particular concern to interviewees, with eighteen requesting a copy of their
transcript, four making revisions to their transcripts for the purposes of anon-
ymisation or clarity of expression and thirteen requiring the approval of any
quotations. Anonymity can be difficult with elite interviews (Walford,
1994, 89–90), with interviewees vulnerable as a result in terms of their rela-
tionships with colleagues (Blakeley, 2013, 165), and the risks of identification
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seem to have been recognised by those involved given the high proportion of
checks and amendments requested.
A limitation of the research is its focus on only three types of experiential
knowledge. This was reflective of the voices that were most visible in both
public debate on the issue and in interview data and can also be attributed
to pragmatic issues around access. A limitation of the current analysis is the
age of the data; with Prevent entering British policy in 2003, the paper dis-
cusses expertise during the strategy’s first eleven years. The issues raised by
the paper however have broader implications for understandings of knowledge
on radicalisation as well as expertise more generally.
Defences and denials of the role of experiential
knowledge in radicalisation expertise
The role of academic knowledge
Academia is a particularly active site of knowledge generation on radicalisa-
tion, with one review finding that 71% of publications were in academic jour-
nals (Neumann and Kleinmann, 2013, 369). Certified, credentialised
knowledge is often seen more broadly as constitutive of expertise (Shanteau
et al., 2002), and Jackson (2012, 18) writes that ‘social scientific credentials’
are one way by which terrorism experts are ‘authorised’ to speak. Peer
reviewed publications, qualifications and position were seen as important by
some interviewees as ways to judge the expertise of themselves and others.
For example, one said:
I’m an academic and my expertise is measured by traditional metrics for academic
expertise. It’s actually very simple. I’m [a senior member of staff in] a centre that
studies radicalisation, I direct research projects in that area, I’ve published
about it myself, so whatever traditional academic metric you use I would probably
be considered an expert in that field. (25)
Conversely, interviewees that had not formally studied radicalisation were
more hesitant to call themselves experts; a distinction was drawn between
having knowledge on the subject and having a qualification and therefore
expertise. Such comments echo Collins and Evans (2007)’s typology of knowl-
edge and their contention that there is a real divide between ordinary peoples’
expertise and specialists’ expertise.
In the main however, academic metrics held limited authority among
interviewees. Many discussed the limitations of research-based knowledge
on this topic, describing it as disconnected and abstract, and arguing that
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the prioritisation of theory development had led to a lack of knowledge on the
local dynamics of radicalisation. One researcher said:
Obviously if you’re coming in as an academic, for example if your PhD was on the
thoughts of Osama bin Laden for example, you may know in depth AQ [al-Qaeda]
ideology, but you’re not necessarily aware of how that plays out locally in a
British Muslim community or in a context like [English city] specifically. And
also maybe the wider repercussions of those sorts of ideas. (11)
This emphasis on the local manifestations of radicalisation theory chimes with
criticisms of radicalisation research for focusing on individual level analysis to
the detriment of context. For some interviewees, the emphasis on the local was
informed by an understanding of the topic as complex and applied: generalised
knowledge on specialised topics was likely only to address an aspect of the
issue, and unlikely to speak effectively to the practicalities of particular situa-
tions. Building a theoretical understanding of radicalisation discorded with
responding to it as a practical problem; for those that prioritised the latter, aca-
demic knowledge had limited relevance and instead expertise was more cred-
ible if it was grounded in specific contexts. These comments came particularly
from those engaged in research that was more closely connected to policy,
practice and communities. They suggest a curtailing of the authority of aca-
demic knowledge within a context of a diverse expert community with signif-
icant non-academic audiences.
The credibility of experiential experts
In this context, experiential knowledge, including that from counter-
radicalisation practitioners, ex-extremists, and communities, has gained visibi-
lity. The 2011 House of Commons inquiry highlighted the potential of prac-
titioner knowledge to contribute to radicalisation theory, particularly given
the lack of ‘objective data’ available (Home Affairs Committee, 2012, 12),
and both Home Affairs Committee inquiries on radicalisation have called wit-
nesses from organisations engaged in practical counter-radicalisation work
(Home Affairs Committee, 2012; Home Affairs Committee, 2016). There
have also been a small number of vocal ex-extremists, with the Quilliam
Foundation the clearest example, who use their personal experiences to offer
generalised ideas about the nature of radicalisation. Hazel Blears, speaking
as an opposition MP in a 2011 debate held shortly before the publication of
the latest Prevent strategy, said that Quilliam ‘have been enormously powerful
and valuable in working out strategies to counter extremism’ (Hansard, 2011:
Column 10WH). The third group is community experts; at the time of the
study, these were individuals from Muslim communities that were the main
focus of counter-radicalisation work. An example of lay knowledge (Wynne,
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1996), this includes those who enter policy, practice and public debate
through community activism. Such experts have been present in policy
debates from the early days of Prevent, through for example the 2005
‘Preventing Extremism Together’ working groups (Home Office, 2005).
These initiatives and comments give some validation to experiential expertise
on radicalisation and all three types have been visible forms of expertise in
public debates on the issue.
The credibility of experiential experts on this topic has multiple bases.
Interviewees talked about practitioners’ ‘direct and personal experiences’
(33) of radicalisation. Such comments spoke to the subjective nature of practi-
tioners’ knowledge, recently shown to be central to how Prevent assesses and
responds to risk (Pettinger, 2020). The expertise of those who work on pro-
grammes like Channel, Prevent’s risk management process, was noted
because they are ‘really really in constant contact with the really top end,
cutting edge bit of radicalisation’ (16). The credibility of these practitioners’
expertise lay then in their observation of and interaction with particular cases
of radicalisation, or knowledge of the dynamics of specific locations, based on
privileged access to rare and covert activity over time. Given the gaps in
primary data on this topic, practitioners’ ability to gain such access is a
source of credibility. Practitioners’ knowledge was often described in terms
of key policy issues, for example how ideologies spread and the role of ‘ideo-
logues’. Interviewees contrasted this detailed, proximal and applied knowl-
edge with distal academic knowledge, here giving the example of the
Strategy to Reach, Educate and Empower Teenagers violence prevention
programme:
So for example you might have a local organisation like STREET that works in
Brixton and nearby areas, where people know people who are being radicalised
and they’ve been subject to those experiences themselves in the past and have
resisted those influences. They would have a very specific in-depth awareness of
the tactics and the procedures used by radicalisers that, you could not really
buy that expertise from an academic that’d studied AQ or jihadist movements
in the UK. (11)
In such comments, practitioners’ knowledge on radicalisation is valued for its
understanding of the practical, local dynamics of radicalisation, and on this
basis they are seen as able to contribute authoritative statements on the
nature of radicalisation.
Ex-extremists’ knowledge on the other hand was described as first-hand,
and its credibility lies particularly in its uniqueness. A think tank researcher
talked about the expertise of ‘those people who have been through the process
themselves and come out the other end’ because ‘they are some of the few
people who actually have access to this thing we’re studying in the first
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place’ (20). A researcher and former counter-terrorism practitioner discussed
the basis of ex-extremists’ expertise through comparison to academics’:
they can give insights that as an academic working in university-shire, you won’t
speak enough Arabic, you won’t have enough hours in the day to go out and talk
to all the people that they can talk to, with the backgrounds that they can talk to.
You won’t be able to understand the context of the theological debates that go on
online for example in extremist forums, you won’t even be able to get access to
them. (9)
Language skills and cultural knowledge are key credibility factors here and
ex-extremists are seen to have a rare ability to shed light on a relatively
inaccessible topic. Given the dominant interpretation of radicalisation as an
individual process, the idea that ex-extremists are able to use their personal
experience to report directly on it is particularly persuasive and underlines
the role of experiential expertise in theorising radicalisation.
The ‘insight’ provided by ex-extremists is similar to understandings of
community experts’ credibility. Interviewees described expertise from com-
munities as religious and cultural knowledge or a detailed understanding of
contemporary dynamics within particular communities; a former government
advisor on Prevent said that one source of radicalisation expertise is ‘experts in
the community who know what the discourses are in the community and are
able to say actually this discourse does impact quite heavily on radicalisation
but that doesn’t’ (18). This expertise is based on long-term interaction with a
community and its politics, often working against extremism, as well as, often,
a shared personal identity. One interviewee for example identified the value of
their contribution to radicalisation debates on the basis of ‘academic research
and also, and more importantly, a long community activism and engagement
and understanding some of the critical political dynamics’ (10). Credibility is
drawn from a closeness to the communities in question; it comes from living
and working in particular contexts and the resultant knowledge is described as
rich, detailed and contextual. There are similarities here with other research in
which community members have claimed a knowledge grounded in lived
experience and characterised by an authenticity lacking in research-based
knowledge (Thompson et al., 2012, 607–9). The authority of community
knowledge on radicalisation was also supported by its policy relevance; it
was knowledge of ‘particular political or religious or other dynamics that
are pertinent to this particular area at this moment in time’ (10). For
example, a Prevent officer in a local authority said that community expertise
was ‘not necessarily expertise in theory or concepts but expertise in the
sense of ‘why’s this guy gone to Syria’ (30). Similar to knowledge from practi-
tioners and ex-extremists, community expertise was seen as essential to an
understanding of contemporary radicalisation, and was distinguished from
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abstract, theoretical knowledge given its nature as embedded in specific
contexts.
Overall then, experiential expertise is prominent in the policy and public
debate on radicalisation and many in the expert community trust in its rele-
vance and authority. Experiential experts can claim an ability to provide
insights where research data is lacking, and a proximity to the policy
problem in contrast to detached and generalizable knowledge. Credibility
based on a close interaction with processes of radicalisation results in knowl-
edge that supports the current policy focus on individual solutions. These
characteristics echo understandings of experiential expertise that emphasise
its pragmatic nature, prioritising problem solving over the accumulation of
knowledge (Borkman, 1976, 449). While evidence hierarchies privilege big,
scientific data (Smith-Merry, 2020), the distinctive character of radicalisation
expertise is indicated by a strong theme of qualitative analysis and professional
opinion. The valuing of experiential expertise for its closely detailed, specia-
lised and rare knowledge points to the nature of radicalisation as topic area
where a diversity of expertise exists.
The contested role of experiential knowledge in
radicalisation expertise
It was clear from interviews however that those within the expert community
challenge the credibility of all three types of experiential claim to expertise in
multiple ways. The first challenge relates to the relevance of the knowledge
offered. Some interviewees questioned the levels of specialist knowledge
among counter-radicalisation practitioners, and highlighted the difficulty of
verification because of limited research access. A think tank researcher for
example was asked whether Prevent practitioners’ direct work on counter-
radicalisation interventions would result in expert knowledge and responded
that, ‘A lot of them don’t do any of that, a lot of them are sitting around
not doing that at all, filling in fundraising forms for trying to get money in
to do projects’ (16). Such comments pointed to the variable levels of expertise
of even specialised practitioners and the importance of the type of experience
upon which experiential expertise is claimed. Similarly, some interviewees
were sceptical about the extent to which ex-extremists’ knowledge was
based on involvement in violence. An academic said:
What struck me, obviously this is not to be generalised to all of them because I’ve
only talked in-depth to one of them, is that this guy was never radicalised. This
isn’t what I call radicalisation, this is maybe teenage rebellion. Their claim to
expertise, I wasn’t impressed. (32)
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Here, non-criminal extremism is seen as almost irrelevant to radicalisation, a
view that was widely held amongst interviewees. Although it is not surprising
that the relevance of an individual’s knowledge shapes their acceptance in an
expert community, it appears here as a particularly powerful way by which the
radicalisation expertise of practitioners and ex-extremists can be questioned.
Similar arguments were used to challenge the relevance of community
experts’ knowledge. An activist and researcher said that:
My own personal experiences of most Muslim community actors who were con-
sulted with by Government did not have the time or resources or even the skills to
actually do a thorough study of those people who might be deemed as radical.
They might have engaged them in order to marginalise them in their own com-
munity institutions, but that wasn’t the same thing as understanding the issues.
(10)
Here, relevant practical experience does not necessarily amount to expertise,
and in particular is not equitable with research-based expert knowledge.
Similarly, a former senior civil servant said that Muslim advisors ‘did not
live up to expectations on radicalisation […] because I think it’s broadly
true that most Muslims don’t know anything more about radicalisation and
terrorism than do most other people’ (29). Comments like this drew a line
not only between ‘most Muslims’ and experts, but also between
individuals who were recognised as experts in Muslim faith or
communities, and experts on the specific topic of radicalisation. An ability
to comment on relevant community dynamics and potential policy
impacts was distinguished from an ability to contribute explanatory knowl-
edge as a radicalisation expert.
The credibility of community experts’ knowledge was also questioned
through allusion to the idea of an ‘Islamic experts industry’. The term
denotes community groups maintained by government funding and thor-
oughly in line with Prevent’s underlying ideology but without specialist
knowledge or valid claims to representation, with echoes of the UK govern-
ment’s tendency to engage mainly with ‘moderate’ Muslims post-9/11 (e.g.
Spalek and Imtoul, 2007). In terms of expertise, interviewees’ comments
focused on the space that Prevent funding created for claims of essential
knowledge. A particularly clear exposition came from a think tank researcher:
Okay, the weird, what happened with Prevent, and this is all relevant, is that
inevitably the Government puts up a load of money and then a load of credible
experts come charging forwards saying ‘yeah I’m an expert on this subject, I’m
from the Muslim community, I’m a former nationalist skinhead’, whatever, and
it’s like a money grab. And you’ve seen all these little experts pop up all over the
place. (16)
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This describes a clear boundary around the expert community that excludes
such self-identifying experts with limited relevant experience. Such comments
also introduce the notion of bias, a powerful attack on credibility given the
controversial nature of this policy area. This reflects a broader tendency in
interviews to criticise other experts, both academic and experiential, for a
lack of rigour due to ideological bias. Overall, the idea of an ‘industry’
points to self-serving experts and the role of politics, networks and funding
in defining community expertise in policy processes. Thus, while policy rele-
vance shapes the community expertise that is legitimated in policy processes,
its ability to support attributions of expertise within the expert community is
more convoluted.
Interviewees also used notions of analytical quality to question the cred-
ibility of experiential experts. Comments differentiated practitioners’ experi-
ence from expertise on the basis of analytical frameworks; although
practitioners may have made empirical observations, their convictions and
the overriding practical imperative to their work limited the quality of knowl-
edge generated. For example, one academic said:
I think that practitioners can do it. […] The job of the scholar however is to
go beyond that and to look at something in a much more systematic way.
It’s not the job of the youth worker to understand everything there is to
know about radicalisation. They will understand a good deal about it because
they’re working with young people, young people talk to them and so on and
they will form views about it, but they don’t necessarily have the whole
picture. (26)
Interviewees used the idea of scholarly analysis in such ways to indicate
a boundary between expert knowledge and practitioner knowledge. The
reference to not having ‘the whole picture’ also relates to a notion of
particularity that was used to question the credibility of ex-extremists’
expertise:
So we’ve got for example Against Violent Extremism, as a group, that brings
together people who have had particular experiences in particular groups. And
obviously they have real expertise within their particular group and at that par-
ticular moment in time. I think it’s quite important that we focus on the time-
bound nature and the location-bound nature of a lot of that expertise. I think
where a lot of the dangers come is when a particular set of experiences then
become generalised, theorised into something which can be applied across
wider periods of time and across wider geographical spaces and socio-cultural
spaces. (28)
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Referring to a network of ‘individuals who have dealt first-hand with extrem-
ism’ (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, n.d.), this academic is applying limita-
tions to the ability of specific individual experiences to be generalised into
theories of radicalisation and used to claim expertise. Drawing attention to
the partial nature of individual accounts is a strong critique given the majority
understanding of radicalisation as a differentiated, complex process. In this
sense, some individual accounts were able to contribute to an understanding
of radicalisation and others to provide illustrative accounts of existing
knowledge, but both could generally be differentiated from the original and
explanatory insights constitutive of radicalisation expertise. The subjective
nature of experiential accounts was also used to question expert credibility:
interviewees differentiated the emotionally vested accounts of ex-extremists,
which were seen to give a particular perspective of the issue based on
ex-membership of a group, from the carefully analysed research data of
experts. In this sense, while the subjective nature of experiential expertise
lends credibility through its deep, specific and pragmatic knowledge, it is con-
tested by those who value abstraction, and referring to objective knowledge is
a powerful way of differentiating expertise from the controversial debate on
this topic. Thus while the relevant and specialist knowledge of many
experiential experts was recognised within the expert community, these
facets of analytical quality were used to disqualify it from constituting
radicalisation expertise.
Overall then, the credibility of experiential experts was contested
along two main lines. First, their knowledge could be constructed as funda-
mentally limited, as marginally relevant to the key issue of violence, or as
contextual but not specialised enough to be constitutive of radicalisation
expertise. Second, the quality of experiential experts’ contributions was
limited through their nature as anecdotal, specific and subjective. Many
such comments construct expertise as scholarly and research-based and
thus exclude personal or professional experience. Given that academic
research is itself criticised for not being grounded in local knowledge and
practical realities, this indicates the flexible nature of radicalisation expert-
ise. It suggests that being regarded as a ‘radicalisation expert’ is not neces-
sary to make authoritative contributions to public debate, but that instead
demonstrating expertise on a related topic is sufficient. This finding can
also be linked to the varying ways by which different audiences make cred-
ibility judgements (Shapin, 1995, 268–271), particularly pertinent given
the different domains within which radicalisation is analysed. Limited as
the terms of discussion may be, the state as well as academia contribute to
terrorism studies (Stampnitzky, 2011, 7), and the media facilitate extensive
public discussion of radicalisation. This not only supports a diverse expert
community but has also fostered extensive contestation and complex
notions of credible expertise. Overall, the characterisation of the topic
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area as new and complex, the limitations to empirical research, and its policy
driven nature interact to create a context that allows a diversity of claims to
expertise to exist In turn, a diverse conceptualisation of expertise creates the
conditions in which credibility is contested and authority falters.
Conclusion
The implications of this pluralist analysis of the radicalisation expert
community are seen in the contested boundaries of its expertise. While
experts seek to differentiate themselves from non-experts and from the
wider public debate on this issue, they do it in diverse and often disputed
ways. Although the data presented in this paper refer to radicalisation expert-
ise during the first decade or so of Prevent, they carry broader meaning; radi-
calisation expertise presents a strong example of the rise in visibility and
influence of experiential knowledge and a set of conditions that facilitate
that success. Experiential experts on this topic can promote and defend their
expertise by characterising it as rare and closely detailed local knowledge, a
persuasive argument in the context of a developing topic area with no estab-
lished group of experts or fixed notion of expertise. In the absence of a strong
evidence base, referring to the challenges of data generation and the blind
spots of academic research on this topic creates space for alternative ways of
demonstrating relevant and useful knowledge. Official statements,
particularly towards the beginning of the Prevent agenda, bolstered these
arguments through their articulations of limited knowledge on the topic
and desire to hear from those regarded as having direct knowledge of the
issues. More generally, experiential expertise draws on an account of expert
credibility that speaks less to generating theory-driven empirical knowledge
and more to policy relevance. The ability to understand and explain
real scenarios and make recommendations for practice is valued by those
that address applied questions. This might be expected given that the
concept of radicalisation originated in policy, official funding has supported
the work of the expert community, and counter-radicalisation remains a
core part of the UK’s counter-terrorism approach; knowledge from outside
the academic community has thrived given the highly applied nature of
this topic.
It is useful to consider the transferability of this research and the implica-
tions that can be drawn as to the nature of expertise and its mobilisation in
policy making processes. We might expect that a similarly controversial
and much-discussed topic area like UK drugs policy would also feature
vocal experiential experts. However, while the drugs debate is closed to alter-
native voices, particularly drug users, by historically dominant policy framings
and expert communities (Monaghan et al., 2018), the diversity in
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radicalisation debates is fostered by the nature of the topic area as newly con-
ceptualised with sparse and contested evidence. Conversely, while there are
longstanding strategic efforts to use experiential expertise in healthcare
policy making, in practice it remains marginalised here too (O’Shea et al.,
2019). In particular, scientific expertise remains dominant and experiential
expertise must usually be supported by another form of evidence in order to
gain credibility (Mazanderani et al., 2020). The case of radicalisation again
provides a contrast to this; as a topic that draws in a broad spectrum of speci-
alisms, competing notions of authoritative knowledge mean that authority is
less tied to science and sources of credibility are more variable. Experiential
expertise was frequently justified through reference to subjective experience
rather than research knowledge and in this sense experiential experts are a dis-
tinct part of the expert community drawing on alternative notions of credibil-
ity. Similarly, while science is the ultimate marker of authority in Gieryn’s
(1999) conceptualisation of credibility contests, not all radicalisation experts
attempt to justify their contributions in terms of science. Building on under-
standings of terrorism expertise as non-institutionalised (Stampnitzky, 2013),
the sub-topic of radicalisation demonstrates the relevance and contribution of
different forms of knowledge and the flexible and permeable boundaries of the
expert community. The characteristics of radicalisation expertise suggest then
the potential of a newly conceptualised, evidence poor and highly applied
topic to create an opening in science-dominant conceptualisations of expertise.
Overall then, experiential knowledge is a powerful marker of authority on
this topic, supporting articulations of the boundaries of expertise and enabling
participation in policy and public debate. Examining the diversity and con-
testation underpinning the dominant ideas of radicalisation behind Prevent
indicates that part of the power of the radicalisation narrative is drawn from
the myriad ways that authority can be claimed on it. At the same time, the
data shows other experts challenging the credibility of experiential knowledge
on radicalisation by reference to its relevance and subjective nature. Flexible
notions of authoritative knowledge enable experiential expertise to be resisted
by those that conceptualise credibility in terms of theory-driven empirical
investigations and value methodological integrity and theoretical advance-
ment. While the boundaries of expertise may have been extended in some
ways to enable a diverse set of experts to participate in generating understand-
ings of radicalisation, clearly the stakes of epistemic authority are high and aca-
demic expertise will attempt to defend itself.
The data also speak then to broader discussions on the structures that
permit or mute voice on this topic. Experiential experts have attempted to con-
tribute knowledge to understandings of radicalisation, and have gained some
success in policy and public debate, yet there is resistance from parts of the
research community. On such a highly contested topic, this raises issues of
inclusivity in conceptualisations of both expertise and radicalisation. There
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have been recent calls to listen widely to different forms of knowledge on ter-
rorism as a way of expanding the parameters of debate (e.g. Jarvis, 2019;
Qureshi, 2020). As demonstrated by the credibility contests (Gieryn, 1999)
discussed in this paper however, reports of lived experience face active
attempts at exclusion from understandings of expertise. Moreover, dominant
framings of the policy problem limit who can speak from an experiential posi-
tion, as indicated by the absence of those processed by counter-terrorism stra-
tegies like Prevent in policy making and research. These constraints on
diversity in the expert community, alongside the fundamentally contested
boundaries of expertise on this topic that mean that there is no one clear, exclu-
sionary notion of authority, reinforce the value of inclusive debates that expand
the types of knowledge that are listened to. Finally, while the paper has
focused specifically on the struggles of experiential knowledge, and while col-
laborative approaches to research increasingly attempt to recognise and value
such knowledge, the power dynamics within universities themselves and the
exclusion of Black, Asian and minority ethnic researchers within academic
practice are being increasingly scrutinised (Brown et al., 2020). These issues
of power define the experiences that are worth knowing and in turn shape
understandings of the topic. The outcomes of credibility contests and the rela-
tive epistemic authority of experts is particularly pertinent in this policy rele-
vant topic area that has wide-ranging impacts on the communities and
individuals that are judged to fall within its remit. An understanding of the
complex ways by which expertise is actively constructed, defended and
denied helps to explain the authority not only of particular experts but the
continuation and direction of Prevent as a highly controversial strategy.
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